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 Introduction 
 Proper medical treatment is routinely defined, in law and in practice, as requiring 
the consent of  the patient. Patients with disorders of  consciousness (long-term 
‘coma’) are unable to give or withhold consent because they are completely 
unconscious (‘vegetative’) or have only fleeting and occasional moments of  con-
sciousness (‘minimally conscious’). They are completely (or largely) unaware of  
themselves and their environment. 1 They cannot understand the situation they 
are in or the treatments on offer; they cannot retain information relevant to a 
decision to accept or to refuse a particular medical treatment, nor can they weigh 
up the pros and cons of  any treatment. 2 In England and Wales these patients, like 
others who lack the capacity to make some or all decisions because of  learning dis-
abilities or dementia, fall under the remit of  section 5 of  the Mental Capacity Act 
2005, which is designed to ensure that proper medical treatment can be provided 
to people who lack the capacity to consent to it without putting doctors at risk of  
criminal prosecution. 
 The initial impetus for the 2005 Act is usually traced to the decision in  F v West 
Berkshire , 3 commonly identified as ‘a turning point in English medical law’. 4 The 
House of  Lords was asked to determine the legality of  sterilising a 36-year-old 
woman with learning disabilities who was deemed incapable of  giving consent 
 6 
* This chapter was part-funded by an ESRC Knowledge Exchange Grant [ES/K00560X/1], which 
also supported the http://www.healthtalk.org module where extracts from the filmed interviews 
can be viewed. The work was also supported by Research Priming Funds provided by the Wellcome 
Trust [ref: 097829/Z/11/A] through the Centre for Chronic Diseases and Disorders (C2D2) at the 
University of  York.
1 Royal College of  Physicians (RCP), Prolonged Disorders of  Consciousness: National Clinical Guidelines (RCP, 
2013), available at https://www.rcplondon.ac.uk/resources/prolonged-disorders-consciousness-
national-clinical-guidelines (accessed 19 December 2014).
2 These are the criteria for determining whether a person has the capacity to make decisions for 
themselves: Mental Capacity Act (MCA) 2005, s. 3(1).
3 F v West Berkshire Area Health Authority [1990] 2 AC 1, HL.
4 A. Grubb, ‘Editorial: Who decides? Legislating for the incapacitated adult’ (1998) 5 European Journal 
of  Health Law 231, 232.
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 5 Despite common public belief  to the contrary, family members have never had the right (qua fam-
ily members) to consent to medical treatments on behalf  of  an adult relative (and still do not). The 
courts had jurisdiction to consent to surgery under the common law principle of  parens patriae, the 
Crown’s ancient duty to protect ‘imbeciles, lunatics and idiots’, but lost this, more by accident than 
design, in 1960 with the coming in to force of  the Mental Health Act 1959, leaving the lacuna in 
the law to which the House of  Lords was now responding.
 6 F (n 3) 34, per Butler-Sloss LJ; 53, per Lord Brandon.
 7 F (n 3) 72, per Goff  LJ.
 8 Emergency treatment was recognised as an exception (Wilson v Pringle [1986] 2 All ER 440, CA), as 
were mental health treatments delivered to patients detained under the Mental Health Act 1983.
 9 This doctrine is traced back to R v Dudley & Stephens (1884) 14 QBD 273: see AWB Simpson, Can-
nibalism and the Common Law (University of  Chicago Press, 1984).
 10 This test is widely used in the law of  medical negligence and requires doctors to act in accordance 
with a practice accepted as proper by a responsible and competent body of  relevant professional 
opinion: Bolam v Friern Hospital Management Committee [1957] 1 WLR 582.
 11 Law Commission, Mentally Incapacitated Adults and Decision-Making: An Overview. Consultation Paper 
No. 119 (HMSO, 1991); Law Commission, Mentally Incapacitated Adults and Decision-Making: A New 
Jurisdiction. Consultation Paper No. 128 (HMSO, 1993); Law Commission, Mentally Incapacitated Adults 
and Decision-Making: Medical Treatment and Research, Consultation Paper No. 129 (HMSO, 1993); Law 
Commission, Mentally Incapacitated Adults and other Vulnerable Adults: Public Law Protection, Consultation 
Paper No. 130 (HMSO, 1993); Law Commission, Mental Incapacity, Consultation Paper No. 231 (HMSO, 
1995).
for the surgery. They found that nobody, including next of  kin and the courts, 5 
had the legal power to consent to medical treatment on behalf  of  another adult. 
Any doctor who operated would do so without consent and, hence, would prima 
facie be guilty of  offences of  battery and/or trespass against the person. Both F’s 
mother and her professional carers wanted to protect F against pregnancy, which, 
according to psychiatric evidence, would be ‘disastrous’ for her mental health, 6 but 
F’s access to the service they believed she needed was impeded by her inability to 
consent and the inability for anyone to consent on her behalf. The House of  Lords 
held that unless some solution could be found, then not just sterilisation but  any 
medical treatment and, indeed, any day-to-day care (for example, ‘dressing, feed-
ing and so on’7) that involved touching a patient without their capacitous consent 
risked liability for tortious or criminal offences. 8 The remedy fashioned in  F v West 
Berkshire was that their Lordships, while acknowledging that they could not consent 
to treatment on F’s behalf, nonetheless granted the declaration that surgery would 
not be unlawful. They did so by invoking the ‘doctrine of  necessity’, 9 holding that 
surgery was ‘necessary’ because it was in the patient’s ‘best interests’ as defined by 
the  Bolam test. 10 
 Although providing a stopgap solution for this particular case,  F v West Berkshire 
exposed a serious lacuna in the common law and the lack of  any comprehensive 
framework to deal with it. Consequently, the Lord Chancellor asked the Law Com-
mission to carry out a consultation exercise on decision-making for incapacitous 
adults, resulting in a series of  publications 11 that culminated in the final report (and 
draft Bill) in 1995 and eventually the Mental Capacity Act 2005. The Act provides 
the legislative framework in England and Wales for determining capacity, appoint-
ing decision-makers, and establishing the basis on which decisions regarding those 
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 12 The only exception is when the person has a valid and applicable advance decision to refuse treat-
ment (under the MCA 2005, ss 24–26), in which case best interests gives way to the decisions made 
by the individual. As with a contemporaneous refusal by a person with capacity, these prospective 
decisions can be binding even if  those caring for the person believe them to be counter to the 
person’s current best interests: Department for Constitutional Affairs, Mental Capacity Act Code of  
Practice (TSO, 2007) paras 5.4, 5.34. Best interests also does not apply, in certain circumstances, to 
participation in research (para. 5.4).
 13 RCP (n 1) para. 3.5.
 14 Aintree University Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust v James [2013] UKSC 67, para. 45, per Lady Hale.
who lack capacity should be made: ‘best interests’. For people with disorders of  
consciousness then, best interests supplants consent as a key criterion on the basis 
of  which an otherwise tortious or criminal act against the person becomes an 
appropriate and legitimate medical intervention. 12 
 People with disorders of  consciousness typically receive a wide range of  differ-
ent medical treatments from the moment of  the injury onwards. The vast majority 
of  these treatments are now commonplace and well-established treatments for 
patients generally (for example, ventilators and feeding tubes), rather than newer 
and more controversial treatments discussed elsewhere in this collection. The con-
troversy, if  there is one, lies only in the application of  these life-prolonging medical 
treatments to this  particular group of  patients rather than involving a controversy 
about the treatments per se. The question that generates fierce debate is should we 
be prolonging, for years or even decades, the lives of  people who have little or no 
consciousness and who are highly unlikely ever to regain it? This is a question that 
is addressed, and evaded, by law and social policy, by media coverage, by profes-
sional codes of  practice, by practitioners, and by family members. 
 For treatment of  an unconscious patient to be lawful (at least after the emergency 
stage), each treatment should be delivered only if  a decision has been made (in 
accordance with the guidelines laid out in the 2005 Act and its associated Code 
of  Practice) that it is in the patient’s best interests to receive it. Best interests is 
not defined in the Act, but a non-exhaustive checklist (section 4) requires the deci-
sion-maker to ‘consider all the relevant circumstances’ (section 4(2)), including, in 
addition to clinical concerns, the person’s past and present wishes, feelings, beliefs, 
values, and ‘any other factors he would be likely to consider if  he were able to do so’ 
(section 4(6)). Alongside this, there is a requirement for the decision-maker to consult 
widely to discover what these wishes, feelings, beliefs, and so on are (section 4(7)), 
and the need for such consultation is also highlighted in professional guidelines. 13 
 Consultation with those who knew the patient before they were rendered unable 
to speak for themselves is crucial for best interests decision-making as a route to try 
to access what the patient might have wanted, and recent case law has emphasised 
that: 
 [I]nsofar as it is possible to ascertain the patient’s wishes and feelings, his 
beliefs and values or the things which were important to him, it is those which 
should be taken into account because they are a component in making the 
choice which is right for him as an individual human being. 14 
Family perspectives on disorders of  consciousness 89
 15 The Government’s Response to the House of  Lords Select Committee Report on the Mental 
Capacity Act 2005, Valuing Every Voice: Making the Case for the Mental Capacity Act (HM Government, 
2014), Foreword by the Minister of  State for Care Services and the Minister of  State for Justice and 
Civil Liberties, available at www.gov.uk/government/publications (accessed 19 December 2014).
 16 L. Clements, C. Kitzinger, J. Kitzinger, ‘Serious medical decisions and the Mental Capacity Act: 
Giving and withholding treatment for patients in prolonged disorders of  consciousness’ (work in 
progress).
 17 See W Healthcare NHS Trust v KH and Others [2004] EWCA Civ 1324, and P (Statutory Will), Re 
[2009] EWHC 163 (Ch), for judicial discussion of  the distinction between best interests and sub-
stituted judgement. The distinction was also made in the Law Commission’s 1991 consultation 
paper (n 11). By the second round of  consultation in 1993, the Commission had arrived at the view 
that they ‘doubt[ed] that the two tests need be mutually exclusive, and favour[ed] a compromise 
whereby a best interests test is modified by a requirement that the substitute decision-maker first 
goes through an exercise in substituted judgment’, a position they confirmed in their final report 
on the grounds of  the agreement of  those they had consulted, Law Commission, Consultation Paper 
No 128 (1993) (n 11) para. 2.14, leading to ss 4(6) and 4(7) of  the 2005 Act.
 18 For more information about families we interviewed, the interview questions, and our anonymising 
procedure see C. Kitzinger, J. Kitzinger, ‘Withdrawing artificial nutrition and hydration from mini-
mally conscious and vegetative patients: Family perspectives’ (2015) 41 Journal of  Medical Ethics 157; 
B. Saunders, J. Kitzinger, C. Kitzinger, ‘Anonymising interview data: Challenges and compromise in 
practice’ (2014) Qualitative Research (online advance access, DOI: 10.1177/1468794114550439), avail-
able at http://qrj.sagepub.com/content/early/2014/09/23/1468794114550439. refs (accessed 19 
December 2014). Filmed extracts from many of  our interviews can be viewed on our online module 
on ‘Family experiences of  the vegetative and minimally conscious states’, available at http://www.
healthtalk.org (accessed 19 December 2014).
 However, as the government acknowledges, the 2005 Act has ‘suffered from a 
lack of  awareness and a lack of  understanding’ and ‘[t]oo many people who may 
lack capacity may be missing out on the legal rights that the [Mental Capacity 
Act] gives them’. 15 Our research regarding people in chronic disorders of  con-
sciousness 16 suggests that they miss out on the legal right (under section 4(6) of  the 
Act) to have their values, wishes, and beliefs represented in decision-making about 
their medical treatments because family members are frequently not consulted, 
as they normally should be (under section 4(7)) about what those values wishes 
and beliefs were. One reason for this is, undoubtedly, because the patient’s own 
(presumed or reported) views are not determinative of  treatment (as they are in 
some US jurisdictions which rely on ‘substituted judgement’), but are subsumed 
by the broader category of  best interests as a criterion for legitimate treatment. 17 
 This chapter is based on interviews with 65 family members of  people with 
chronic disorders of  consciousness (such as in vegetative or minimally conscious 
states), and explores how people understand proper medical treatment in this con-
text. In-depth narrative interviews (on average around three hours in duration) 
were carried out by one or the other of  the two co-authors, and included questions 
about how medical decisions were made, who made them, the process of  decision-
making, and whether the interviewee considered particular treatments to be in the 
patient’s best interests, as well as their view about whether or not the patient would 
have wanted them. 18 Here we present family accounts in relation to emergency 
treatments, life-prolonging but non-restorative treatments, and the special case 
90 Celia Kitzinger and Jenny Kitzinger
 19 J. K. Mason, G. T. Laurie, Law and Medical Ethics (8th edn, Oxford University Press, 2011) 66.
 20 See H. Marsh, untitled video, available at http://www.healthtalk.org/peoples-experiences/nerves-
brain/family-experiences-vegetative-and-minimally-conscious-states/professor-henry-marsh
#ixzz3KdrZdq2p (accessed 19 December 2014).
of  clinically assisted nutrition and hydration. We show that there was a diversity 
of  views as to what constitutes appropriate or proper medical treatment for these 
profoundly brain-injured patients, but that, for most of  them, the patients’ own 
views (as families understood them) were crucially important. We set these fam-
ily accounts in the context of  contemporary law and medical practice relating to 
the treatment of  people in chronic disorders of  consciousness which (at least in 
theory) uses best interests, rather than the patient’s reported views, as the criterion 
for determining treatment options. 
 Emergency treatments 
 Prolonged disorders of  consciousness are caused by severe brain damage in com-
bination with subsequent medical interventions that prevent the person from 
dying as a result of  that damage. Brain damage is the result of  traumatic injury 
(typically a road traffic accident, sporting injury, or assault), anoxic injury (loss of  
oxygen to the brain such as is caused by a stroke, cardiac arrest, or near-drowning), 
or brain disease (for example, viral encephalitis). In the emergency phase, the 
hours and days after the precipitating event when death is a likely outcome of  
non-treatment, patients are likely to receive at least some of  the following treat-
ments: cardio-pulmonary resuscitation (CPR), tracheotomy, mechanical ventilation, 
clinically-delivered nutrition and hydration, a brain shunt, and surgery to remove 
blood clots in the brain and/or a decompressive craniectomy (removal of  part of  
the skull to relieve pressure on a swelling brain). 
 Legally, some emergency interventions without consent can be justified under 
the doctrine of  necessity; that is, in the absence of  any information that the patient 
would object to treatment, it is considered that doctors who carry out interven-
tions in order to save life should not have criminal or civil liability imposed upon 
them because the good effect they are seeking to bring about ‘outweighs the value 
of  adhering strictly to the law’ .19 The extent and severity of  a person’s brain dam-
age is very often not apparent at the point of  emergency intervention, and when 
a patient ends up in a permanent disorder of  consciousness this usually could 
not have been accurately predicted at the point of  the initial medical interven-
tion. Indeed, if  a clinician had known this would be the outcome she might have 
deemed intervention futile in the first place. Intensivists and neurosurgeons inter-
vening at this stage may have different clinical judgements about the likely out-
come, and also different attitudes towards what risks should be taken of  a poor 
outcome balanced against the chances of  meaningful recovery. Some clinicians 
may judge intervention to be justified, while others are increasingly concerned at 
the future harm their interventions can cause, which leads them to become more 
conservative in their practice. 20 
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 How, then, against this background, do families talk about what is proper treat-
ment? In our research, many family members accepted that, initially, medical 
treatments were justified, ‘It’s all about keeping someone alive  .  .  . and you do 
whatever has to be done’ (Kate). But, in retrospect, most expressed some con-
cern about the decision to intervene to keep the patient alive, often based on the 
assumption that medical professionals must have known (or should have known) 
what the eventual outcome would be. Belinda, whose son was in a vegetative state 
eight months after being assaulted, describes her initial belief  (reinforced by medi-
cal professionals) that her son ‘was going to be okay’. It was this belief  that, for her, 
justified doing surgeries: 
 They took him right up for his first operation on his brain. The right side 
of  his head was completely caved in and they haven’t rebuilt it. Then he 
had to have another operation, swelling on the other side of  the brain. They 
were very good there but they still assured us [he] was going to be okay. We 
knew he might have some disability like maybe a speech thing, or maybe not 
being able to walk straight off, you know the normal things that you’d think 
of . . . We really, really thought that he would come out of  it. 
 Proper medical treatment in the early stages meant, for most family members, 
whatever doctors said it was. This is a position they have since re-evaluated. In 
retrospect, many thought they were too ‘innocent’, or that doctors ‘never told us’ 
important information: 
 When we started this, I was such an innocent and if  somebody had said to 
me ‘Right, do we operate or don’t we? Do we put him into intensive care or 
don’t we?’ . . . I wouldn’t have actually known. I was very much in the hands 
of  the professionals. (Dawn) 
 We can’t help him. We can’t treat him. We can’t look after him. So we’re 
handing him over to somebody who has the skills, the knowledge, the experi-
ence, to take him through this stage and bring him out the other side and go, 
‘There we are. There’s Patrick back!’ They never told us they couldn’t bring 
Patrick back. (Thomas) 
 Tania, interviewed jointly with her husband, Ian, describes how two different 
surgeons expressed contrasting views about the proper medical treatment of  her 
son Charles: 
 We were actually sitting up to the early hours, planning Charles’s funeral. 
We went back the next day, we saw the  other surgeon, with the optimistic air, 
and  he didn’t mention anything about us saying goodbye to Charles. It was a 
 completely different track. He started talking about fitting a tracheostomy. And 
we were  absolutely staggered  . . . And so we’d got a complete  roller coaster of  you 
know, pretty much ‘say goodbye to Charles, go home, come back the next 
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day’, and we came back the next day I suppose expecting to  be asked about 
having the life machine turned off. But we  weren’t . It was this  other man wasn’t 
it, and he uhm ( Ian interjects : gave us a bit of  hope) Yeah! And he just said you 
know, ‘he’s  young ’, and he just had this feeling . . . And you  want everything 
to be okay. You want to believe the  good things, and  we didn’t want to lose 
Charles, we were in total shock, so we agreed to the decision to have the tra-
chy fitted . . . Would that I  hadn’t given permission to do the surgery. Would 
that they hadn’t got to Charlie in time to resuscitate him – knowing  now what 
I didn’t know then. 
 Only a few families considered, at the time, that life-prolonging medical treat-
ments in the early days or weeks might  not be appropriate, and in every case family 
members said that this was because they knew that life with profound brain injuries 
(whatever the eventual diagnosis/prognosis) was not something the patient would 
have wanted, and that the patient would not have wanted to take the risk of  such 
an outcome. For these family members the doctrine of  necessity that would oth-
erwise have justified emergency treatment to save life, was trumped by their belief  
that the patient herself  would have refused treatment under these circumstances: 
 They [other family members] said that this is a woman who loved country 
life, loved family, very, very active, don’t operate on her if  she is not going to 
have a quality of  life that she – you know, if  she’s not going – if  she’s going to 
be very, very profoundly brain damaged . . . Exactly as she is now, we didn’t 
want – because we knew that she wouldn’t have wanted that at all. And they 
continued operating another two or three times to take blood clots. I think she 
had a massive swelling and they were taking blood clots out . . . I don’t know 
why they went on operating on her, knowing how profound her brain damage 
was, why they didn’t just let her go, why they didn’t just stop. (Diana) 
 In sum, in the immediate aftermath of  the emergency, life-prolonging treat-
ment is often initiated and continued in order to keep people alive and prevent fur-
ther damage occurring, so that once stabilized they can be properly assessed. For 
many people this is proper treatment, and many family members we interviewed 
believed that their relatives would have been willing to receive emergency treat-
ments in such circumstances. But a few reported that their relative would never 
want to run even a small risk of  ending up in such a condition and would want to 
refuse treatment early on. 
 It was also striking in our research that reporting on their  own wishes, as opposed 
to what they believed their injured relatives’ wishes would have been at the time 
of  their injury, many interviewees had come to narrow their definition of  proper 
medical treatment for themselves. Some family members, including those who 
supported or fought for treatments to keep their relative alive, had themselves 
made advance decisions refusing treatment in emergency situations like these, 21 
 21 Advance decisions to refuse treatment now have statutory support: MCA 2005, ss 24–26.
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 22 See healthtalk.org, ‘Reflections on own end of  life wishes’, available at http://www.healthtalk.
org/peoples-experiences/nerves-brain/family-experiences-vegetative-and-minimally-conscious-
states/reflections-own-end-life-wishes (accessed 19 December 2014).
 23 RCP (n 1) section 1.5.
 24 RCP (n 1) section 1.7.
 25 RCP (n 1) section 1.7.
 26 RCP (n 1) section 1.5: ‘Permanent’ means, in this context, that recovery ‘may be regarded as highly 
improbable’.
 27 See healthtalk.org, ‘Recovery’, available at http://www.healthtalk.org/peoples-experiences/nerves-
brain/family-experiences-vegetative-and-minimally-conscious-states/recovery (accessed 19 Decem-
ber 2014).
 28 J. Kitzinger, C. Kitzinger, ‘The “window of  opportunity” for death after severe brain injury: 
Family perspectives’ (2013) 35 Sociology of  Health and Illness 1095 (http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/
doi/10.1111/1467-9566.12020/pdf ).
‘I don’t want anything if  my brain is damaged in any way. I’m really quite strict 
about it. I’m not that scared about death’ (Daisy). For Daisy, and others like 
her, the only proper treatment after brain injury is palliative care permitting 
death. 22 
 Life-prolonging but non-restorative treatments in ‘continuing’ 
and ‘permanent’ disorders of  consciousness 
 Prognosis for patients in disorders of  consciousness becomes more accurate over 
time. The longer a brain-injured patient remains unconscious, the less good their 
eventual recovery is likely to be. At four weeks post-injury, a patient who is still 
unconscious, or virtually so, is said to be in a ‘prolonged’ or ‘continuing’ disorder 
of  consciousness. 23 This is not a ‘permanent’ diagnosis; recovery can and does 
continue for at least some months, and often for some years. A permanent veg-
etative state (PVS) cannot be diagnosed until several months after non-traumatic 
injury, three months in the US and six months in the UK. 24 It takes even longer 
for a PVS diagnosis if  the injury is the result of  a traumatic injury; in that case 
a permanent diagnosis is not appropriate until at least one year. 25 The time span 
is extended again if  the patient is minimally conscious, rather than completely 
unconscious; only after five years can the ‘minimally conscious state’ (MCS) be 
formally diagnosed as permanent. 26 In practice, this means that many patients 
are maintained for years in vegetative or minimally conscious states in the hope of  
eventual recovery, and a few of  the patients whose families we interviewed had, in 
fact, recovered full consciousness, albeit with profound multiple neurological (and 
physical) disabilities which meant that they still lacked capacity to make medical 
decisions for themselves. 27 However, as we have explored elsewhere, by the time 
that the patient’s diagnosis (for example, as being in a PVS) is finally confirmed, 
the ‘window of  opportunity’ for a relatively quick death (for example, by removing 
a ventilator) has usually long passed. 28 
 Ongoing medical treatments and procedures provided to these patients can 
include, in addition to clinically assisted nutrition and hydration, some ongoing 
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 29 Watch a video of  Mikaela, available at http://www.healthtalk.org/peoples-experiences/nerves-
brain/family-experiences-vegetative-and-minimally-conscious-states/resuscitation-and-dnr 
(accessed 19 December 2014).
 30 Watch a video of  Jim, available at http://www.healthtalk.org/peoples-experiences/nerves-brain/
family-experiences-vegetative-and-minimally-conscious-states/resuscitation-and-dnr (accessed 
19 December 2014).
mechanical ventilation/breathing support (for example, oxygen at night, a trache-
otomy, or regular suctioning), a range of  medications including antibiotics (espe-
cially for pneumonia, which is common in this patient group), and physiotherapy. 
They may also receive other diagnostic procedures and interventions (such as rou-
tine cancer screening and testing for cholesterol, hypertension, or diabetes), plus 
any relevant treatments for these conditions and immunizations (for example, the 
‘flu jab’). For many family members these various treatments became less and less 
appropriate for their relative over time, as they came to believe that their relative 
would not want to be kept alive in their current state. 
 Many families were aware that CPR would not be available to their relative  and 
accepted this . The single most common reason was that they came to believe that 
their relative would not want it. Mikaela’s father had, some years prior to the injury 
which left him in a vegetative state, survived a stroke which left him impaired but 
still with a quality of  life he considered worthwhile. Mikaela reported having had 
conversations with him about his wishes because of  this earlier injury, ‘I knew how 
he was. His views on this kind of  thing before were so strong after his stroke that 
he didn’t want to be alive if  he couldn’t do things for himself . . . So that [agreeing 
to no resuscitation] was easy for me’ .29 Mikaela was relieved that she knew her 
father’s wishes, and it made it ‘easy’ for her to know that (for him) CPR was not 
an appropriate treatment. Jim, likewise, felt that the burden of  deciding about 
proper treatment for his wife, Amber, was lifted by his knowledge that Amber did 
not want CPR. Asked how he knew, Jim said: 
 From our discussion. I knew that Amber, if  the only course of  action was to 
resuscitate her, Amber didn’t want it done. And it made – I mean, when the 
consultant told me, I turned round and said ‘That is Amber’s wishes’. I didn’t 
have to make the decision. 30 
 Another interviewee, Gordon, described how his family arrived at the decision 
that his wife should be given only limited CPR, and, again, this was based on the 
family understanding of  what the views of  the patient would have been: 
 The three of  us discussed it, and we told them what our view was . . . we said 
they should try and resuscitate her once and if  it was a respiratory or if  it was 
a cardiac, they should try and resuscitate her once and if  she didn’t respond 
forget it. And she pulled through. And that happened two – I think two other 
occasions. ( Interviewer: What did you take into account in trying to make that decision 
at that time?) The life that she may have afterwards and also going back to her 
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 31 See Aintree (n 14), where there was a long disagreement between a family and a hospital as to 
whether particular medical treatments were appropriate. The patient, David James, died of  a 
cardiac arrest after the Court of  Appeal declared that it was lawful to withhold CPR, a decision 
subsequently upheld by the Supreme Court.
 32 Watch a video of  Fern, available at http://www.healthtalk.org/peoples-experiences/nerves-brain/
family-experiences-vegetative-and-minimally-conscious-states/resuscitation-and-dnr (accessed 
19 December 2014).
and my discussion, that she didn’t want to be a burden on anybody. And if  
she wasn’t going to have a reasonable life after it, if  she was going to be more 
incapacitated than what she was – we didn’t want that for her. We didn’t want 
that for her and she wouldn’t have wanted it either. 
 On the other hand, several families successfully challenged ‘do not resuscitate’ 
notices. For them, CPR  was appropriate medical treatment because they did not 
want to ‘give up on’ the patient. They believed the patient ‘deserved a chance’, 
and would have wanted to take that chance themselves. 31 Fern, talking about her 
partner, said that she at first believed: ‘He’s got to have a fighter’s chance, how 
dare you give him a DNR [Do Not Resuscitate order].’ Shortly after the DNR had 
been removed, Fern’s partner had a second cardiac arrest and was resuscitated. 
Reflecting on this some years later Fern commented: 
 the brain damage he sustained the second time has been catastrophic. Abso-
lutely catastrophic.  .  . . And I do regret that, you know, well no I don’t, I 
don’t regret it. At the time I made a choice for him that I felt was right at 
that time. But I now know I could never put another one on him and should 
I be in a situation with anybody else I care about, I probably wouldn’t do 
it . . . I just couldn’t do it to another human being what I feel like we’ve done to 
him . . . But having seen the damage of . . . removing the DNR . . . I think they 
were right to put it on him. I can’t regret it. What can I do now – we did it. But 
I definitely – should I repeat this over again in some weird parallel universe I 
would not remove it. I would let him die on that second cardiac arrest. 32 
 Like Fern, Daisy and the rest of  her family also, at first, insisted that their rela-
tive should be resuscitated if  necessary and receive all other possible treatments. 
However, the whole family subsequently came to believe that he would rather be 
dead than continue in his MCS. Looking back, Daisy (like Fern) still sees decisions 
made to demand treatments considered inappropriate by the medical profession-
als as right  at the time . The decisions were right because they would have been 
what her brother would have wanted them to do, even though, like the rest of  the 
family, he would later have changed his mind about wanting to be kept alive and 
might have made different decisions had he had more information: 
 At the time we didn’t know anything at all [about serious brain injury and its 
implications], and Nathan wouldn’t have known anything at all. If  Nathan 
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had  me in that situation, he would have fought for  me to have everything pos-
sible . . . Because of  what we’ve experienced we now know the consequences 
of  everything. But not having known what the consequences were, we defi-
nitely, definitely, wanted to fight [for treatment] . . . I mean if  all of  us had 
been experts at the time in brain injury and Nathan had as well, then we 
would have all said, ‘Oh no, don’t worry about treatment. I know that he 
would prefer to die.’ But the whole point is we  didn’t . 
 The importance placed on what the patient would have wanted extends, in 
some of  these accounts, then, to recognising that the patient (like the family) 
would at first, albeit out of  ignorance, have wanted all possible life-prolonging 
treatments and would (like the family) have only gradually come to realise that 
they were only extending a life which would never again be (for them) a life 
worth living. 
 Some family members reflected guiltily that the treatments they wanted for their 
relative, and were fighting for, might be ethically unjustifiable. The mother (Ann) 
and sister (Bea) of  a long-term PVS patient (interviewed together) commented: 
 Bea: The other thing that . . . I had trouble with, was fighting for Fiona’s care at 
the [financial] cost that we know it is and fighting for that above the care 
for possibly a cancer patient who’s a parent of  young children or something. 
And we find – I find that very difficult to deal with, to think about. I just try 
not to think about it. 
 Ann: Yeah, it gives you very much a guilt complex when you think how much 
money is involved and how that money could be used. Yes. But, you know, 
when it’s your own, you have to fight for them. There’s nothing else you 
can do. But, you know, common sense tells you that it could be used a lot 
better. 
 Once families accept a permanent diagnosis, they oppose many more treat-
ments. When death is seen as what the patient would prefer, many treatments 
designed to keep the patient alive are seen as inappropriate. As Fern says, it is not 
a life her partner would want: 
 You get to a point when there’s no improvement and you stop being able to 
convince yourself  there is. When they are constantly hooked up to IVs and 
having painful UTI infection . . . When they spend their entire life in a state 
of  pain and discomfort . . . this isn’t a life worth sustaining. It’s not a life they 
would want and it’s not a life I want for him. And no matter how much I 
would like to believe he would have a miracle and we would see him recover 
and how much joy that hope would give me, if  you can’t see that anymore and 
you realise that death would be better now, I think that’s when the acceptance 
comes . . . There’s better ways to show I love him than to prove I’m sustaining 
him. You know, he knows I loved him. I’ve done it. I’ve got my medals. I was 
there [laughs]. I supported him. I fought for him . . . Don’t need to prove it to 
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anyone, because I proved it to myself  and I proved it to him. He knows it. He 
knows that I did everything I could. 33 
 Phil was more ambivalent about whether antibiotics were appropriate treat-
ment for his (minimally conscious) partner, setting his partner’s previous views 
(that ‘no one would ever want to be like this’) against what he felt facing that 
situation, and holding open the ‘horrible’ possibility of  non-treatment. Again, the 
touchstone for deciding on appropriate treatment was what the patient himself  
would have wanted and/or what he might plausibly want now: 
 But I think if  he did get really ill then I probably would look to see if  he could 
just go quietly. And I talked to his – luckily he and I and his mum were always 
on the same page about no one would ever want to be like this. They say that 
if  you  are like this then your perspective changes, so you can’t guarantee that 
he wouldn’t want to have an existence where he could have pleasure from my 
daily visits, daily visits from other people and the dog and all those things. But 
if  something serious happened to him health-wise again we might look to see 
if  he would be able to go quietly instead of  fighting so hard to help him live, 
and that’s horrible. 34 
 Withholding or withdrawing treatment is often described by families (and clini-
cians) as ‘leaving nature to take its course’ or ‘letting fate decide’, or even allowing 
the patient – or the patient’s body – to decide. Ann and Bea, mother and sister of  
the patient, agreed with the hospital early on that mechanical ventilation was an 
inappropriate treatment for her pneumonia: 
 Ann: Yeah, but there was a question of  her going back on a ventilator. 
 Bea: They suggested that we probably didn’t want to do that. 
 Ann: And  we decided we didn’t want to do that because- 
 Bea: But it’s interesting that they did suggest it. 
 Ann: Yes, because they said, ‘Well, you know, she might get over it this time, but 
maybe two months down the line it’ll happen again’, and so on. And so we 
decided, no, we don’t want to just see her weakened, weakened and weak-
ened and, you know, go that way. So we decided that we’d leave it to fate at 
that point, you know. 
 Untreated illness without proper palliative care leads patients to behave in 
ways that family members interpret as evidence of  pain; for example, the ragged 
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breathing, choking, coughing, and gurgling phlegm of  untreated pneumonia. 
When families experienced the patient as suffering they saw treatment such as 
ventilators and antibiotics as appropriate, even if  they had previously believed 
that these treatments should be withheld to allow the patient to die. When life-
prolonging treatments could also relieve suffering, they were actively requested 
for that reason. Ann and Bea (quoted above) subsequently reversed their agree-
ment to non-treatment for their relative, with Bea actively involved in providing 
chest physiotherapy on one occasion when her sister became very unwell with 
pneumonia because she felt her sister was suffering. The wife of  another patient 
similarly could not sustain her position that no treatment should be provided for 
her husband’s chest infections. She said that, ‘He had a lot of  phlegm and was 
choking – and that’s horrific, watching someone who’s going through like that. 
And again you think, “Can I really be that cruel?” You can’t’. (Shula) 
 Thus, distress about patient suffering during the dying process led families to 
request life-prolonging treatments, even when they considered them otherwise 
inappropriate and believed the patient would rather be dead. 
 When family members viewed treatment as possibly illegitimate they compared 
it to criminal acts like torture, Kathy said, ‘I feel like I’ve sat watching her being 
tortured at times and I’ve tried to comfort her while that’s happening to her. And 
that’s a very morally ambiguous position’. Similarly, ‘[c]ontinuation of  this painful, 
frustrating non-existence and not being able to do anything he was before is not in 
his best interests. Prolonging it is akin to torture’ (Daisy). And Dee said: 
 They kept saying, she’ll still be PVS in a year. So just wait a year and then 
you go to court. And we were going, ‘But she’s suffering now. Why make her 
suffer 365 days before she can be put out of  her suffering? And they just said, 
well, that’s the law, you have to wait 365 days.’ So as far as we saw it, she was 
being tortured for 365 days and then we would get a court to agree that she 
could be allowed to die. 
 Furthermore, the conduct of  medicine/practitioners/medical institutions was 
sometimes presented as illogical, improper, and an abuse of  power akin to hijack-
ing and kidnapping: 
 Just because you’re in a uniform and you work for a big corporation, it does 
not give you the right to kidnap someone and force them. But evidently it 
does in the world we live in. Evidently, they can hide behind that . . . You love 
them. They don’t . . . And if  you don’t have the right, which you don’t, you 
know, and that goes all the way from the beginning all the way through. It’s, 
well, disgusting. Disgraceful isn’t the word for it. Again, it is just so wrong. 
They’re hijacked and kidnapped throughout, yeah, because the kidnapping 
started for Bill there, and continued. (Rose) 
 In sum, families’ beliefs as to what constitutes proper medical treatment for 
patients in long-term disorders of  consciousness is a complex phenomenon 
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generally rooted in their belief  about what their relative would have wanted, with 
an understanding that this would have changed over time (as the outcome for 
the relative became clearer). Views are also informed by the desire to release the 
patient from a life not worth living, balanced by the desire to avoid the patient suf-
fering repeated near-death experiences. 
 The special case of  artificial nutrition and hydration 
 Severely brain-injured patients cannot swallow and can only be provided with the 
nutrition and hydration essential to sustain life by tube feeding. Usually, artificial 
nutrition and hydration (ANH) is delivered via a nasal-gastric tube within the first 
few days after injury, followed a few weeks or months later by surgery to insert 
a tube directly into the stomach (for example, percutaneous endoscopic gastros-
tomy (PEG) or other surgically inserted gastrostomy tube). Both inserting feed-
ing tubes and delivering substances through them are legally defined as ‘medical 
treatment’, 35 and can be done without the patient’s consent if  (in the absence of  a 
valid and applicable advance decision to refuse them) they are considered to be in 
the patient’s best interests. What makes ANH a special case, and unlike all other 
medical treatments provided to patients in disorders of  consciousness (and indeed, 
unlike all treatments for patients with any other diagnosis), is that, in England and 
Wales, it  cannot be withheld or withdrawn without a declaration from the courts of  
the lawfulness of  so doing. 36 
 Inserting a feeding tube is an invasive procedure, and its use is associated with 
risks (for example bleeding, displacement, and infection) and burdens (discomfort 
caused by pulmonary edema and gastrointestinal disturbance). Feeding tubes can 
also become blocked, worn out, or require repositioning due to infection, all of  
which require further invasive procedures. It is widely recognised that ANH may 
not always be in a patient’s best interests, especially near the end of  life, and treat-
ment is commonly withheld or withdrawn in these circumstances. 37 When a patient 
is not imminently dying, the General Medical Council’s guidance requires that a 
second clinical opinion is sought before withholding or withdrawing ANH.38 How-
ever, for PVS and MCS patients, and  only for this group of  patients, withdrawal of  
ANH requires legal review. An application  must be made to the Court of  Protection 
for a declaration that it would be lawful to withdraw ANH. 39 This requirement 
is a legacy of  the  Bland case, in which the House of  Lords recommended that a 
court declaration should be required in such cases ‘at least for the time being and 
until a body of  experience and practice has been built up which might obviate the 
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need for application in every case’. 40 The requirement remains, despite the view 
of  the British Medical Association and expressed more than a decade after the 
decision in  Bland , that PVS cases should no longer inevitably require court review 
where consensus exists, as long as such withdrawal is in accordance with agreed 
guidelines. 41 
 Following the decision of  the Supreme Court in  Aintree University Hospitals NHS 
Foundation Trust v James , the focus of  the court is not supposed to be on whether it is 
in the patient’s best interests to withhold treatment (of  any kind) but on whether it 
is in their best interests to give or to continue treatment. 42 But the requirement to 
seek declaratory relief   specifically in relation to withholding or withdrawing ANH 
from patients in a PVS or a MCS, and not for providing or continuing to provide 
this medical treatment, appears contradictory. It also places ANH in an anoma-
lous position in relation to the concept of  the medical exception. A procedure 
considered a tortious or criminal offence if  it is not performed in the best interests 
of  the patient is singled out for special scrutiny by the courts. But this special scru-
tiny is designed in order to establish the lawfulness of   non -treatment rather than 
of  treatment, and only for this particular group of  patients. Following the decision 
in  Bland , courts must be approached for declarations that it is lawful to  withdraw 
feeding tubes from patients in a PVS, but not for permission to (re)insert them or 
to continue administration of  nutrition and hydration through them after a PVS 
diagnosis is confirmed. Two recent Court of  Protection cases addressed treatment 
provision for patients in a PVS for whom ANH had been provided for four years 43 
and nine years, 44 respectively. Withdrawal was declared to be lawful in both cases, 
but neither judge conveyed any concern about the improper medical treatment 
meted out to these patients over such long periods of  time. It is this focus on the 
lawfulness of   non -treatment rather than of  treatment that makes ANH a special case 
for patients with disorders of  consciousness and for their families. 
 Every court case in England and Wales concerning the administration of  ANH 
to a patient with a confirmed PVS diagnosis has resulted in the treatment being 
withdrawn or withheld. In the over 100 cases since  Bland , ANH has never been 
found to be in the best interests of  a patient in a PVS. There is, then, no legal 
justification for making a medical exception of  ANH for PVS patients. However, 
ANH for PVS patients is routine practice, supported by families, treating clinicians, 
Clinical Commissioning Groups (CCG), insurance companies, and NHS con-
tinuing healthcare funding. Doctors do not seem to fear prosecution for offences 
against the person of  the PVS patients to whom they deliver ANH, and the law 
seems tacitly to condone the widespread administration of  ANH to PVS patients. 
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For example, there has been no litigation against medical professionals who 
have authorised, permitted, or performed ANH-related treatments on their PVS 
patients, and public funds are used to support the practice. 45 Perhaps, then, we 
overstate the importance of  the medical exception as providing protection for 
doctors who might otherwise face tortious or criminal charges, since it seems that 
a medical treatment that cannot claim this status is, nonetheless, widely practiced, 
commonly accepted, has never been prosecuted, and does not, even when treat-
ment cessation is declared lawful, attract the censure of  the courts. 
 One contributory factor that may help to account for this apparently contra-
dictory situation is a widespread perception that ANH differs from other medical 
treatments in being an ordinary (as opposed to an extraordinary) part of  basic 
care, and, perhaps, from some perspectives, not a medical treatment at all. Pro-
viding food and water has a powerful symbolic value, and the alternative is often 
described as starving someone to death. The legal requirement to apply for declar-
atory relief  for withdrawing ANH, but not other treatments (such as antibiotics or 
mechanical ventilation), supports that perception. Most of  the families we inter-
viewed, even those who approved or initiated court applications for withdrawal of  
ANH, believed that ANH was, in fact, appropriate or proper treatment for their 
relative. 46 Those who accepted or advocated its withdrawal did so only because it 
was the ‘least worst’ option in a desperate situation; that, it was the only (lawful) 
way of  bringing about the patient’s death. For example, Jane responded angrily 
to a care home manager’s advice about the possibility of  ANH being withdrawn 
from her father, and expressed her baffled outrage to the interviewer: 
 Have you heard of  that? That’s crazy to me. Because they can’t tell you if  they 
can feel anything, but they will let them die if  they stop his feed. So you have 
to watch your family member starve to death. It’s just – what – who would 
do – why? Why? Why would you want-? Why? That’s the bit –  why ? It just 
doesn’t make sense. 
 Similarly, Morag was completely opposed to withdrawing ANH from anyone, 
however badly brain-injured: 
 We could have applied for a court order to remove his feeding, his tube feed-
ing, but you wouldn’t starve an animal to death, so you certainly wouldn’t 
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starve your loved one to death because people can live for such a long time 
without food and just getting weaker and in more pain. And there was no 
way – you know, you wouldn’t starve an animal to death, so there’s no way 
that, you know – for me, that’s not an option, you know. I just don’t see how 
that could ever be an option. 47 
 Families said they had come to see ANH as an option at the point at which they 
believed that the patient’s suffering could no longer be justified and there seemed 
no other way out. For example, Helen initially believed that ‘there’s no way I would 
even consider that’, but later changed her mind, and supported an application for 
ANH to be withdrawn so that her son could die: 
 [A]bout twelve months later I’d seen him through several nightmare urinary 
tract infections. I’d watched him lose weight. I’d watched his skin start to 
break down. I’d seen him in pain. I’d seen the splints that he’d got on his 
hands start to cut into his wrists. And just the general wear and tear of  inten-
sive and invasive nursing practice began to tell on his overall physical health. 
And it was at that point I started to reassess. 48 
 Another interviewee, Gunars, said that he had first realised that his sister was 
probably in a PVS after reading a newspaper story about the death of  Helen’s 
son from ANH-withdrawal. The family had never been given a diagnosis, but the 
journalist’s description of  PVS ‘ticked every box’. His family then initiated the 
process whereby the CCG applied for a declaration from the courts that with-
drawing the feeding tube from his sister would be lawful, and his sister died ten 
days after this declaration had been granted. Despite actively participating in this 
process, Gunars was, nonetheless, clear that the provision of  nutrition and hydra-
tion to a PVS patient  is appropriate treatment, and that withdrawing it in order to 
allow death is neither compassionate nor dignified: 
 What we look for as human beings is to be treated compassionately and with 
dignity, and in many ways a prisoner on death row in America gets treated 
better because at the end of  the day he will eventually find out that the day 
of  reckoning’s come and it’s a simple injection. But what we discovered in 
the process we entered into was my sister was effectively going to be denied 
hydration and nutrition which basically means that you’re starving somebody 
to death. Is that a humane way to treat a human being? My response to that 
is not  .  .  .  And fundamentally in this country we treat our pets, our farm 
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animals, our equine friends, more sympathetically and with greater compas-
sion and dignity than we do human beings. 49 
 Gunars’ partner, Margaret, pointed out that: 
 [I]f  we wished to bring this to a conclusion because we considered that it 
was in her best interests, then that was the only route that was available to 
us .  .  . We don’t think it is the best option. We think there should be other 
options. But within the law at the moment it would appear that is the only 
option. 50 
 There is a real disjuncture here between legal and family perspectives relating 
to ANH cessation. From the legal perspective, at least in theory (though as we have 
outlined above, the situation is more complicated in practice), ANH  is medical 
treatment, and has never been considered appropriate for patients in a PVS. In 
addition, a person making a best interests decision regarding life-sustaining treat-
ment ‘must not, in considering whether the treatment is in the best interests of  the 
person concerned, be motivated by a desire to bring about his death’. 51 From the 
family perspective, ANH is very often considered to be basic care, and, as such,  is 
appropriate for PVS patients. They are often horrified and dismayed at the idea of  
ANH being withheld or withdrawn. The only reason family members are willing 
to support cessation of  nutrition and hydration is because they believe their rela-
tive would rather be dead, and they understand that this is the only lawful method 
whereby this objective can be definitely accomplished, 52 most especially if, as most 
have, they have repeatedly witnessed the failure of  other lawful methods of  allow-
ing death, for example, untreated pneumonia. 
 Conclusion 
 In this chapter we have explored family perspectives on proper treatment in rela-
tion to their vegetative and minimally conscious relatives. What is distinctive here, 
as compared to other treatments considered in this collection, is that the major-
ity of  the treatments provided to such patients are now commonplace and well-
established treatments for patients generally, for example ventilators and feeding 
tubes, rather than being particularly new or controversial per se. Our analy-
sis has shown that families’ views about proper medical treatment for severely 
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brain-injured patients generally include full emergency treatments and all possible 
life-prolonging measures in the acute period in order to stabilize the patient and 
buy time to consider diagnosis and prognosis. However, treatments seen as appro-
priate in the first year or so may be viewed as no longer appropriate two or three 
years later because if  the patient remains in a vegetative or minimally conscious 
state, then the rationale for such interventions is no longer justified. The possibil-
ity that the suffering and indignity the patient is enduring might open the door 
to a future life that the patient would find worthwhile has receded. At this point 
families may agree with clinicians that certain treatments should not be given, in 
the full expectation that the patient may soon die (after all, the patient’s life seemed 
to ‘hang on a thread’ in the emergency period). However, unlike patients with 
terminal cancer, or the very frail and elderly, these patients (often young and physi-
cally healthy) may continue to live for years or decades as long as ANH continues 
to be provided, despite decisions such as ‘no aggressive treatment’ of  infections. 
This leaves some families retrospectively to view initial treatment decisions as mis-
guided, questioning treatments that resulted in their relative being kept alive. On 
the other hand, some people retain a belief  that decisions to deliver life-sustaining 
treatments early on were proper  at the time , based on their own or their relative’s 
ignorance, the clinician’s lack of  certainty of  the outcome, and the need to give 
their relative the chance of  a meaningful recovery (even if, as it turns out, that 
chance has not ‘paid off ’). 
 The special place of  ANH as a treatment that cannot be withdrawn without 
resort to the courts is highly significant in shaping family views of  proper medical 
treatment. By requiring declarative relief  for withdrawal of  this particular treat-
ment (and no other) from this patient group uniquely (while ANH can be with-
drawn from all other patients without legal review), the law acts to deter ANH 
withdrawal from PVS and MCS patients, adding to the already hugely symbolic 
freight of  ANH withdrawal the additional, often intimidating, obstacle of  court-
rooms with lawyers, expert witnesses, judges, and, potentially, the media. It leads 
to life-prolonging treatment by default, without reference to the best interests of  
the person who (in the opinion of  many families) is ‘trapped’ in a ‘fate worse than 
death’. Keith Andrews, a leading neuro-rehabilitation specialist, commented on 
the reasoning in  Bland that ‘the only reason that tube feeding has been identified 
as “treatment” has been so that it can be withdrawn’. 53 It is ironic, then, that two 
decades later, routine medical practice is to  deliver ANH to PVS and MCS patients 
 as if it were a proper and legitimate treatment, and that the law (in particular, 
Practice Direction 9E) 54 constitutes a barrier to any systematic consideration of  
whether or not continued delivery of  this medical treatment is covered by the 
medical exception as being in the patient’s best interests. 
